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Liberal Equality and Ethics*
Matthew Clayton
I. LIBERAL EQUALITY
Dworkin’s conception of distributive justice, equality of resources, re-
quires equality in the distribution of impersonal resources and com-
pensation for personal resource deficits, or their consequences, to be
determined by a fair hypothetical insurance scheme. Among other
things, that conception offers a recognizably liberal account of inter-
personal comparison for the purposes of justice. Consider the envy test,
for example. Dworkin cites the envy test as a test for equality in the
distribution of impersonal resources, such as wealth, land, occupation,
and material goods. The test is satisfied if no one prefers anyone else’s
bundle of impersonal resources to her own.1 The attractions of the envy
test within a liberal conception of equality are evident. First, it conforms
to a widely held egalitarian view that an individual is disadvantaged if
she enjoys less wealth than others because of the circumstances in which
she lives (e.g., living in an area with less fertile land than others enjoy),
rather than because of her ambitions. If Alice and Biff both hold the
same goals but Alice faces a more propitious material environment in
which to pursue hers, then both would prefer to be in her position.
The envy test highlights those kinds of inequality as unjust.2
* This article derives from a presentation to a conference on Ronald Dworkin’s
Sovereign Virtue hosted by the University of London School of Advanced Study, Philosophy
Programme, on March 23, 2001. I thank the participants at the conference for their
comments. For other helpful comments I am grateful to Justine Burley, Paula Casal, Simon
Clarke, Deborah Mabbett, Mark Philp, Katherine Watson, Martin Wilkinson, Andrew Wil-
liams, and an anonymous referee for Ethics.
1. Dworkin emphasizes that the envy test is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition
of equality in the distribution of impersonal resources. See Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign
Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000),
pp. 67–68, 134–62.
2. Note that this view is widely, though not universally, shared by those who describe
themselves as egalitarians. For a prominent alternative conception, see Elizabeth Anderson,
“What Is the Point of Equality?” Ethics 109 (1999): 287–337; Timothy Hinton, “Must Egal-
itarians Choose between Fairness and Respect?” Philosophy&Public Affairs 30 (2001): 72–87.
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Second, the envy test’s reliance on preferences in establishing
whether inequality exists satisfies the liberal concern that justice must
be sensitive to the diverse lifestyles pursued by different individuals.
Some individuals may want to pursue a life of service to others and
abandon a concern for personal monetary advantage, while others might
choose to pursue wealth. Such heterogeneity of ambition is accom-
modated by the envy test. A distribution in which an individual who
pursues a service-oriented occupation, which in the competitive market
yields low income, is not, according to the envy test, disadvantaged
compared to someone who pursues an alternative occupation for high
income, if the former does not prefer the latter’s bundle of wealth and
occupation.3
Dworkin is, of course, aware that other conceptions of equality
aspire to ambition sensitivity. He famously criticizes equality of welfare
for being sensitive in the wrong way. A number of problems beset that
conception, not least the problem of expensive tastes.4 Dworkin cites
the case of Louis who has developed particular tastes, which make it
the case that more impersonal resources are required to ensure that he
acquires an equal level of welfare—understood in terms of either en-
joyment or preference satisfaction. Equality of welfare is committed to
financing Louis’s tastes at the expense of reducing everyone else’s level
of welfare. Intuitively, while an egalitarian would not condemn Louis
for having cultivated his tastes, neither would she require others to
finance their satisfaction: Louis must accept that the price of having
such tastes is a lower level of welfare. This kind of response is supported
by the envy test. Since Louis does not prefer to be in anyone else’s
position compared to his own, he suffers no disadvantage that generates
grounds for compensation from the perspective of justice.5
In summary, the envy test is able to explain the conviction that
disadvantageous circumstances warrant egalitarian compensation, while
differences in what individuals have that are attributable to their am-
bitions do not.6
3. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, pp. 83–85.
4. Ibid., pp. 48–59.
5. Note that Louis might be thought to be disadvantaged in a way that does not
warrant compensation from the perspective of egalitarian justice. It might be bad luck
for him that he lives in an environment in which the phyloxera has attacked great wine-
producing vines, which makes it more costly to satisfy his preferences. Nevertheless, this
disadvantage is consistent with the absence of any comparative disadvantage, as defined by
the envy test, which would generate grounds for compensation from the point of view of
egalitarian justice. For further discussion of the distinction between comparative and
noncomparative disadvantage, and its relevance to Dworkin’s reply to Cohen’s critique of
equality of resources, see Matthew Clayton, “The Resources of Liberal Equality,” Imprints
5 (2000): 63–84.
6. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, p. 89.
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Certain standards of interpersonal comparison that have been de-
fended in the debate about egalitarian justice—such as primary goods,
capabilities, and access to welfare—list a set of goods, the possession of
which is taken to be in the interests of individuals.7 In order to make
good their claims that they are disadvantaged from the point of view
of justice, individuals must establish that they lack the goods itemized
as being in their interests while others enjoy them. In contrast, the envy
test enables individuals to bring their own views about what is beneficial
for them to bear on the question of whether they suffer a disadvantage.
As Dworkin states, equality of resources “allows us to cite, as disadvan-
tages and handicaps, only what we treat in the same way in our own
ethical life.”8 This requirement is attractive to many liberals because it
provides an account of equality that refrains from appealing to a con-
crete conception of what makes one’s life a success. What a “concrete”
conception of well-being amounts to needs spelling out, but, for illus-
tration, it might cite certain kinds of artistic or religious achievement,
or the satisfaction of preferences, as components of a successful life. By
avoiding an appeal to such a concrete conception of well-being as the
basis of its account of advantage, Dworkin’s resource egalitarianism re-
spects a widely affirmed liberal constraint, that government must not
prescribe any concrete conception of the good life for individuals or
rely on such an account in the defense of its principles and policies.
The envy test satisfies this requirement in its insistence that what counts
as an advantage or disadvantage is to be determined with reference to
the ambitions of the individuals whose advantage is under consideration.
This feature of equality of resources also provides an explanation
of its objection to welfarist metrics of interpersonal comparison. For it
does not allow a person to cite the lack of a particular good, such as
preference satisfaction, as a disadvantage if she rejects welfare as a good
when considering her own well-being. Thus, Louis cannot cite his ex-
pensive tastes as handicaps warranting egalitarian compensation, be-
cause his life is in part guided by the satisfaction of those tastes without
which, he believes, his life would go worse. He cannot, in good faith,
claim that he is less advantaged than others in virtue of his lower level
of welfare, when he cares so little about welfare in his own life that he
wouldn’t be prepared to develop cheaper preferences that are more
easily satisfied.9
7. For a critical survey of these conceptions, see Matthew Clayton and Andrew Williams,
“Egalitarian Justice and Interpersonal Comparison,” European Journal of Political Research
35 (1999): 445–64.
8. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, p. 294.
9. Dworkin argues that since Louis regards his tastes as an important part of his
lifestyle, he is consequentially responsible for his tastes, in the sense that he must bear
the burden of a lower level of welfare than others, even if he is not causally responsible
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II. EQUALITY OF RESOURCES AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM
Dworkin’s own defense of the liberal aspect of equality of resources
appeals to a controversial account of ethics and its relationship to justice.
The evaluation of that defense is the principal concern of this article.
Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing that his account of resource egal-
itarianism and, in particular, its insistence on the relevance of first-
person judgments to the assessment of advantage might appeal to egal-
itarians who are attracted to political liberalism. Thus, liberal equality
represents an alternative to justice as fairness as a political conception
of justice.
Political liberals assert that, ideally, political principles and their
justification should be capable of endorsement by free and equal in-
dividuals who hold different and possibly inconsistent comprehensive
convictions.10 Now liberal equality requires individuals to assess whether
they are disadvantaged compared to others in the light of their own
distinctive comprehensive convictions. It therefore seems capable of
gaining wider public acceptance as a test for equality compared to met-
rics that require individuals to express their claims for social funds on
the basis of lacking particular goods, for example, welfare, even when
the individuals concerned do not value such goods.
When Dworkin discusses political liberalism in the context of his
defense of resource egalitarianism, he raises it as a possible basis on
which to disregard individuals’ own ambitions or judgments about what
is required to live well. Thus, he employs it as providing grounds for
objecting to equality of resources. The aim of such a political conception
of justice is to obtain public acceptance of its principles by refusing an
appeal to controversial ethical convictions in defending them and their
methods of implementation. In an environment in which there exist
divergent conceptions of the good life, Dworkin supposes that his critic
would advocate “a special, made-for-politics morality,”11 a morality which
all can accept and refer to in adjudicating their competing claims when
acting as political agents, even if various individuals or groups reject
that morality as an appropriate guide to their own ethical lives. Thus,
Dworkin supposes that an advocate of equality of welfare might help
himself to this strategy in order to rebut the reliance on individuals’
ambitions that we find in resource egalitarianism. Were that strategy
available, it would be open for a welfare egalitarian to argue that even
though an individual doesn’t value welfare in his own life, that need
for them. See ibid., pp. 285–99. For further discussion of Dworkin’s critique of equality
of welfare and his response to metrics that include equality of access to welfare, see Clayton,
pp. 72–84.
10. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
11. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, p. 294.
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not make it inappropriate for us (and him) as political agents to adopt
welfare as the metric for making interpersonal comparisons with regard
to matters of justice. Dworkin’s response is that his liberalism is drawn
from an account of personal ethics and is, therefore, antagonistic to
the notion of a “made-for-politics” account of advantage.12
However, it is important to distinguish between two ways in which
the political liberal’s concern for public acceptance of a conception of
justice might be delivered. The first is Dworkin’s thought that she would
describe a “made-for-politics morality,” which insists on the importance
of citizens obtaining certain goods, even when the possession of such
goods is regarded by some individuals as an impediment to the pursuit
of their own ethical commitments. The second strategy is to fashion a
standard of interpersonal comparison that accommodates, rather than
disregards, the ethical convictions of different individuals by permitting
each to express her claims for compensation by citing a lack of items
that she regards as helpful in the realization of her own ambitions. The
accommodation strategy objects to metrics that list a number of goods
on the basis of which different lives can be compared, because any list
will include goods whose value is questioned by some. Liberal equality
fits the bill of the accommodation strategy well, since it does not pre-
scribe any list of that kind. Indeed, by allowing individuals to bring their
own convictions to the egalitarian table, it is better suited to the ideals
that animate political liberalism than the made-for-politics metric. Thus,
since political liberals might follow a strategy of accommodation to
achieve public agreement on their principles of justice, they are free to
adopt liberal equality as their conception of justice.13
III. ETHICAL GROUNDS FOR LIBERAL EQUALITY
Dworkin’s own argument for liberal equality appeals to a controversial
account of ethics. He describes an account of ethics, the challenge
model, in which living well consists in responding in the right way to
an appropriate challenge. His argument is that liberal equality is the
conception of justice best suited to the requirements of the challenge
model.
Before we proceed to examine the challenge model’s defense of
12. Ibid., pp. 294–96.
13. Note, however, that certain political liberals might think that the accommodation
of different comprehensive doctrines that liberal equality effects comes at a price. As Rawls
insists, one attractive feature of primary goods as a standard of interpersonal comparison
is their workability within a public conception of justice. See John Rawls, The Law of Peoples
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 13. In contrast, the use of the envy
test and hypothetical insurance schemes within liberal equality rely upon complex coun-
terfactual judgments that are difficult to make and which might jeopardize citizens’ con-
fidence that justice prevails.
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liberal equality, we must note that Dworkin insists that liberal equality
does not rely on this particular ethical defense.14 He advertises an al-
ternative ethical account, ethical individualism, which, he believes, has
fewer detractors and is sufficient to support liberal equality. That ac-
count offers two principles—the equal objective importance of human
lives and individuals’ special responsibility for the lives they choose—as
the bases of the distinction, at the center of liberal equality, between
ambition sensitivity and endowment insensitivity in the distribution of
resources. Ethical individualism is elaborated in Dworkin’s 1998 Dewey
Lectures, “Justice for Hedgehogs.” Its evaluation must await another
occasion.
Here, I want to consider Dworkin’s appeal to the challenge model
in defense of liberal equality. The model is interesting and has received
critical scrutiny in its own right as a conception of how to live well.15
However, my present interest in it is limited. The question that I address
is whether the challenge model, if sound, provides sufficient grounds
for liberal equality. In particular, can liberal equality’s reliance on in-
dividuals’ own judgments about whether they are disadvantaged com-
pared to others be supported by appeal to the challenge model?
The task for any ethical defense of liberal equality is simple to state.
If we start with what we take to be the best account of what it means
to live a successful life, we must show how that account gives us reason
to allow individuals to employ their own, possibly inadequate, concep-
tions of the good life in the assessment of whether they are disadvan-
taged. For it is not obvious that the accommodation of different ethical
convictions, which equality of resources effects, is warranted by the right
conception of ethics. Consider, for example, certain perfectionists who
hold that lives devoted to religious worship are less successful than many
alternative lifestyles, because they are premised on false beliefs or involve
the pursuit of projects that lack value. If these judgments are sound,
and if we think it appropriate, as Dworkin does, for politics to flow from
ethics, then it might be thought just to offer in-kind compensation to
individuals who, because of their family or social background, have been
deprived of an equal opportunity to experience or engage in valuable
lifestyles. Political institutions might, in addition, encourage the pursuit
of more fulfilling lifestyles through the granting of public subsidies to
these alternatives.
The problem is that these proposals, for in-kind compensation or
subsidies for worthy causes, violate a couple of features of equality of
14. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, p. 241.
15. See, e.g., Martin Wilkinson, “Dworkin on Paternalism and Well-Being,” Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies 16 (1996): 433–44; Richard Arneson, “Human Flourishing versus
Desire Satisfaction,” Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (1999): 113–42, esp. pp. 135–42.
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resources. First, if we adopt these proposals, the standard of interper-
sonal comparison that we favor is likely to be one that determines the
terms in which others phrase their requests for compensation. Instead
of being allowed to bring one’s own religious convictions to the egali-
tarian table, as liberal equality would have it, we would be required to
make our claims for compensation by reference to the right, in this case
humanist, account of ethics. Second, liberal equality requires equality
in the opportunity costs that others must bear with respect to each
individual’s bundle of resources. But if the government subsidized a
particular activity, such as the activities of humanist or valuable non-
religious societies, the distribution of resources would thereby become
unequal, because the opportunity costs to others of a humanist life
would be higher than those of a religious life: the humanist would enjoy
more resources being devoted to his goals, resources which might have
been given to the devout to pursue theirs.16
Dworkin’s response to this kind of argument is that it rests on a
mistaken account of ethics. He draws a distinction between two levels
of ethical inquiry. First, there are “the more abstract levels at which we
puzzle, not about how to live in detail, but about the character, force,
and standing of the very question of how to live” and consider, for
example, why living well has importance, who is responsible for ensuring
that individuals’ lives are successful, and the metric with which to judge
whether someone’s life goes well. Second, there are the concrete levels
of ethics at which we worry about, for example, whether “a good life is
necessarily a religious one.”17 On the basis of this distinction, Dworkin
argues that the right abstract account of ethics requires us to adopt a
conception of distributive justice that does not take a stand on the merits
of different people’s concrete ethical convictions. In what follows I ex-
amine what I take to be the two central arguments Dworkin offers in
defense of equality of resources’ reliance on individuals’, possibly in-
adequate, concrete ethical convictions.
IV. THE CHALLENGE MODEL AND THE GOODS OF
IDENTIFICATION
The first set of claims that I want to look at concerns the importance
of individual identification with respect to the lives people pursue. Ac-
cording to the challenge model, living well consists in responding in
16. I am assuming, however, that while the distribution of resources would be unequal
according to liberal equality, these proposals are supported by a conception of equality
that is motivated by some ideal of equal access to valuable activities. To be sure, it is no
part of these proposals that those who hold sound views of well-being deserve more
resources than those who hold mistaken views. The proposed subsidies are motivated by
the concern to equalize access to human flourishing.
17. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, pp. 239–40.
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the right way to the right challenge. What matters then is a particular
kind of performance and not merely the outcome, considered inde-
pendently of the performance, that is produced by one’s life. And Dwor-
kin insists that the motives from which one acts are relevant to the
evaluation of that performance.
Let us distinguish between two ways in which identification might
matter when assessing whether an individual lives well. First, Dworkin
insists that a person’s pursuit of particular goals, projects, or relation-
ships can contribute to the success of his life only if he identifies with
them. This is summarized in Dworkin’s account of ethical integrity:
“Someone has achieved ethical integrity, we may say, when he lives out
of the conviction that his life, in its central features, is an appropriate
one, that no other life he might live would be a plainly better response
to the parameters of his ethical situation rightly judged.”18 A person
who identifies with a different feasible lifestyle to the one he leads lacks
ethical integrity, and, no matter how well he pursues the activities of
his life, they fail to benefit him, because ethical integrity is a necessary
condition of living well.
Second, Dworkin insists that living well requires not merely iden-
tifying with one’s life. It also requires the individual himself to identify,
or choose, the central goals, projects, and relationships which make up
his life: “the most important part of the challenge people face in leading
a life . . . is identifying life’s value for themselves.”19 The good of iden-
tifying the commitments and projects the pursuit of which would im-
prove one’s life goes beyond the claim that it is necessary for an indi-
vidual to identify with his life, for plainly one can come freely to identify
with one’s life even if one didn’t choose it from the outset. Dworkin’s
case of the child who is forced into taking piano lessons but who comes
to accept that they did make his life go better is an example of how
the two sorts of identification can be distinguished.20
Note that Dworkin thinks that the quality of one’s concrete goals,
projects, and relationships does contribute to the success of one’s life.
Playing the piano well, for example, might improve one’s life if one
accepts its value, while being a couch potato might not. So Dworkin
distances himself from those who believe that an individual’s identifi-
cation of, or with, his ethical life is sufficient for his life to go well.21
Since that is the case, a perfectionist critic might seek to show that
a conception of distributive justice that encouraged the pursuit of par-
ticular concrete conceptions of the good would improve people’s lives.
18. Ibid., p. 270.
19. Ibid., p. 277.
20. Ibid., p. 269.
21. Ibid., pp. 271–72.
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She would have to show how the particular distribution of resources she
favors would get individuals to abandon goals that lack value and to adopt
high quality goals, without jeopardizing the goods of identification.
In his discussion of the goods of identification, Dworkin explains
how the priority of ethical integrity and the good of identifying life’s value
for oneself render various kinds of state paternalism self-defeating. He
also employs these ideas to support liberal equality. He considers the
proposal that a government might choose a particular conception of well-
being and use it to judge the success of the lives of different individuals
for the purposes of determining what justice requires. One of his replies
is that “ethical liberals could not accept this, because government would
then usurp the most important part of the challenge people face in
leading a life, which is identifying life’s value for themselves.”22
But consider the proposal outlined above, in which the humanist
offers an account of distributive justice which subsidizes the pursuit of
high quality activities and regards as disadvantaged individuals who,
through no fault of theirs, lack the opportunity to pursue such high
quality nonreligious pursuits. Under that conception of justice, any
claim for compensation would have to show how possession of additional
resources would enable the person in question to pursue such goals
more successfully. A person who proposed to spend any additional re-
sources he might receive entirely on religious pursuits could offer no
such claim.
But in what sense does the humanist’s proposal violate the goods
of identification? First, she does not seek to use force to make believers
lead lives the value of which they reject. And, second, her proposal
seems consistent with the requirement that individuals should choose
the goals and relationships that make up their lives. For the proposal
does not eliminate any lifestyle from the menu of options available to
individuals; it merely changes some of the costs and benefits derived
from them.23 If these claims are sound, then the goods of identification
are compatible with the rejection of equality of resources. Thus, the
complaint of someone who has fewer resources devoted to his religious
life, compared to the amount that subsidized nonbelievers receive, is
22. Ibid., p. 270.
23. One other component of ethical integrity which bears on this issue concerns the
conditions under which a change of identification with respect to a particular lifestyle can
be said to be genuine. Such a change is compatible with ethical integrity only if it is
effected through an individual’s reflective appreciation of the comparative merits of dif-
ferent lifestyles. This important condition requires the elaboration of a conception of
liberal education and motivates a concern that subsidies are not so great that the delib-
erative capacities of individuals are inhibited. For discussion, see ibid., pp. 218, 272–74.
But while this concern might affect the size of the subsidies offered to valuable activities,
it does not, I believe, rule them out as a matter of principle.
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not forceful in virtue of him being deprived of the goods of identifi-
cation. In addition, since the subsidization of valuable pursuits is de-
signed to contribute to people’s well-being by facilitating a change of
identification, there seem to be positive reasons to depart from equality
of resources.24
One response to this argument for departing from liberal equality
might point out that if the government changed the costs and benefits
of different concrete lifestyles by subsidizing certain activities, it would
be usurping the challenge individuals face in terms of identifying life’s
value for themselves. For the environment in which they live is one that
is determined by the fact that others see the value of these lifestyles,
while they themselves do so to a lesser extent. Consequently, they cannot
take full credit for identifying the life they lead if they do indeed follow
the high-quality subsidized options.
However, even if a response of this kind were available, it is unlikely
that it would support liberal equality. Under liberal equality, if I un-
derstand it correctly, private individuals are free to subsidize what they
take to be valuable activities or relationships if it is part of their ambition
to encourage others to lead better lives. But if the good of choosing a
life for oneself rules out government subsidies for valuable activities, it
seems that it must also rule out individuals choosing to use their re-
sources to subsidize such activities.25
Consider a possible reply to this objection. It might be thought too
difficult for public agencies to distinguish between inappropriate phil-
anthropic activity by individuals and their self-regarding conduct that,
while permissible, has similar effects with respect to the choices other
people face. Consequently, a legal prohibition on private subsidies could
be enforced only at the cost of jeopardizing the ethical goods that liberal
egalitarians aspire to protect, namely, the goods of individuals identi-
fying and pursuing lifestyles in their own way. In this respect, there is
a relevant distinction between public and private ethics, for, unlike pri-
vate individuals, the state has no life of its own to lead which would be
threatened by a ban on its subsidizing valuable activities.
Even if this reply retains a place for private philanthropy within
liberal equality, however, it is not obvious that it preserves the right kind
of place. For the conception of civil life at the center of many concep-
24. For related discussion, see Thomas Hurka, “Indirect Perfectionism: Kymlicka on
Liberal Neutrality,” Journal of Political Philosophy 3 (1995): 36–57, esp. pp. 49–50; Colin
Macleod, Liberalism, Justice and Markets: A Critique of Liberal Equality (Oxford: Clarendon,
1998), chap. 7.
25. Here I follow Raz’s objection to a similar argument offered by Waldron. See
Joseph Raz, “Facing Up: A Reply,” Southern California Law Review 62 (1989): 1153–1235,
pp. 1233–35; Jeremy Waldron, “Autonomy and Perfectionism in Raz’s Morality of Freedom,”
Southern California Law Review 62 (1989): 1097–1152, see esp. pp. 1147–49.
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tions of liberalism, Dworkin’s included, is one in which individuals re-
gard themselves as morally, as well as legally, permitted to engage in
evangelical and philanthropic activity, including the use of monetary
resources to present their lifestyles in their best lights and to encourage
others to pursue them. Yet, if we consider the moral permissibility of
subsidies from the point of view of liberal equality, public and private
variants stand or fall together.
V. LIBERAL EQUALITY AS A PARAMETER
We have seen that the challenge model interprets living well as respond-
ing in the right way to the right challenge. A second argument for liberal
equality focuses on how we ought to characterize the notion of an
appropriate or right challenge. Before I get to that argument, let me
fill in some detail about the notion of facing the right challenge.
An attractive feature of the challenge model is that it can explain
how it is possible for different kinds of life to be valuable, depending
on the circumstances within which they are pursued. As Dworkin says,
“a life of chivalrous and courtly virtue might have been a very good one
in twelfth century Bohemia but not in Brooklyn now.”26 That is the case
because different circumstances produce different challenges, each re-
quiring distinct responses and associated virtues for the challenge to be
appropriately met. Dworkin puts the point in terms of the distinction
between limitations and parameters. In living our lives, the circum-
stances in which we operate often constitute limitations on, or aids to,
what we have reason to pursue. Nevertheless, certain aspects of our
condition are parameters, which are partly constitutive of the challenge
we face. If we view well-being in terms of a successful response to the
challenge we face, we should regard certain facts, such as our being
human and certain capacities and attachments that we have, as con-
tributing to the definition of that challenge.27
Dworkin proceeds to discuss normative parameters, which are those
circumstances that should constitute the background from which one
responds to the challenge of living. He offers a reasonable lifespan as
an example of a normative parameter: a significantly shorter lifespan
deprives one of an appropriate challenge. This enables him to complete
the abstract characterization of the challenge model of ethics: “Living
well means responding in the right way to the right challenge . . . a
life goes worse when the right challenge cannot be faced.”28 Of particular
relevance for an assessment of Dworkin’s liberalism is his view that justice
26. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, p. 258.
27. Ibid., pp. 260–63.
28. Dworkin, “Foundations of Liberal Equality,” in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values,
vol. 11, ed. Grethe B. Peterson (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1990), p. 73.
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is a parameter, in the sense that if someone holds an unjust share of
resources, he faces the wrong challenge, and it is unlikely that any
achievement of his life can compensate for that defect.
How does the notion that living well requires a just share of re-
sources support Dworkin’s claim that liberal equality is the best account
of justice? So far as I understand it, his argument is that treating justice
as a parameter of ethics means that we cannot offer an account of living
well without reference to the notion of justice. So, for example, we
cannot offer an itemization of goods, such as being educated, healthy,
financially secure, and so on, the possession of which would funda-
mentally improve someone’s life, irrespective of whether the distribution
of such goods is just or unjust. For the possession of such goods may
not contribute to one’s well-being if one enjoys an unjust share of them.
Thus, conceptions of justice that proceed from a conception of well-
being defined without reference to norms of justice, and then theorize
justice as, say, equal access to well-being, mistakenly suppose that our
interests can be defined independently of an assessment of what justice
demands. Similarly, our humanist’s proposal, that we can distribute re-
sources in a manner that encourages individuals away from unworthy
pursuits into worthy ones, errs in supposing that we can identify what
would be good for people independently of identifying what a fair share
of resources would be.
The conclusion Dworkin defends is that theorizing justice as a fair
compromise between different individuals’ competing interests is mis-
taken. Because living well depends upon living within just arrangements,
those arrangements must be conceptualized without appealing to a con-
ception of well-being that is defined without reference to justice. How-
ever, advocates of certain metrics of egalitarian justice—such as welfare,
access to welfare, or capability accounts—do claim that these goods serve
our well-being, and that this can be established before we address the
question of whether their distribution is just or unjust. According to
Dworkin, those accounts are untenable if justice is a parameter of the
good life.29
Because justice is a parameter of ethics, Dworkin claims that in
defending a conception of justice we must appeal to intuitions about
justice in the absence of a detailed account of well-being. We do, of
course, have an abstract understanding of well-being, provided by the
challenge model, which, Dworkin claims, favors an egalitarian concep-
tion of justice: the challenge model interprets living well as an appro-
priate response to the challenge of living and is therefore addressed to
29. See Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, pp. 277–78, “Foundations of Liberal Equality,” pp.
92–98.
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anyone who lives.30 Nevertheless, that abstract account cannot indicate
in any detail what is good for people, because whether the possession
of a particular item is good for someone depends upon whether its
possession is consistent with justice.
Let us accept Dworkin’s claim that an adequate conception of jus-
tice is egalitarian.31 Are there good grounds for adopting resource egal-
itarianism over, say, equal access to welfare? If successful, the justice-as-
parameter-of-ethics argument rules out arguments for access to welfare
as the best metric of egalitarian justice if the defense of its adoption is
that it is required by the right conception of well-being. However, as
Dworkin himself points out, welfare might be taken to be an appropriate
standard of interpersonal comparison when issues of distributive justice
arise, even if it is rejected as a characterization of well-being.32 Never-
theless, as we have noted, Dworkin argues that welfarist conceptions are
inadequate as metrics of justice, even when we consider them purely as
metrics for dealing with issues of justice without invoking them as ac-
counts of well-being as well.33
Dworkin’s claim is that if justice must be theorized independently
of a detailed account of well-being, then some version of equality of
resources is the best conception available. That claim has considerable
plausibility. I am less convinced by the antecedent claim, that we cannot
invoke some reasonably detailed conception of well-being when thinking
about justice, even if we accept the parametric status of justice with
respect to the good life.
Suppose that justice is a hard parameter of ethics34 and, in addition,
30. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, p. 279.
31. That concession is controversial. Even if resources are the appropriate means of
conferring a challenge, it does not follow from the fact that the challenge of living is
addressed to anyone who lives that resources should be distributed equally. Some might
argue that successfully overcoming the limitations imposed on one by a physical or mental
impairment makes one’s life just as much a success, or perhaps more of a success, compared
to performing well in life without such impairments. The success of an individual’s life
might be determined by her response to the challenge that nature, among other things,
sets her, even if the distribution of natural resources is unequal between individuals. So,
the inference from the universality of the challenge of living to an egalitarian conception
of its content requires more justification than Dworkin offers. Since my primary focus is
on the liberal component of equality of resources, however, I put this issue to one side.
32. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, pp. 19–21. For a similar suggestion, see T. M. Scanlon,
“The Moral Basis of Interpersonal Comparisons,” in Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being,
ed. Jon Elster and John Roemer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
33. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, chaps. 1, 7. See, in particular, his discussion of the problem
of expensive tastes.
34. Note that Dworkin thinks that justice is merely a soft, rather than a hard, parameter
of living well. That is, the life of someone who enjoys an unjustly large share of resources
is “not automatically worthless, and might be a very good life” (ibid., p. 266). He illustrates
this with the examples of Michelangelo, whose great works were financed by the Medici,
Clayton Liberal Equality and Ethics 21
that justice is viewed in access egalitarian terms. Why cannot consid-
erations of well-being considered independently of justice figure in the
determination of such a conception of justice? Given our assumptions,
we might ask the following hypothetical question: “what would benefit
individuals if different individuals enjoyed equal access to such goods?”
Because that question is coherent and invites a number of possible
replies, there is a space for a perfectionist egalitarian account of inter-
personal comparison. For example, offering access to education, art or
culture, or opportunities for the development and exercise of various
virtues might enhance people’s well-being if the government ensured
that all enjoyed equal access to such goods. Since this is the case, a
perfectionist egalitarian may offer an account of justice understood in
terms of equal access to goods related to human flourishing. Treating
justice as a parameter of ethics provides no reason why the metric of
egalitarian justice must be theorized in ethically neutral, resourcist
terms.
To be sure, the challenge model remains antagonistic to certain
metrics of egalitarian justice, such as equal access to welfare, but that
is for reasons other than their failure to accommodate the parametric
status of justice. Welfarism remains an inadequate conception of living
well because it is blind to the insight that well-being is fundamentally
about meeting an appropriate challenge. Nevertheless, other perfec-
tionists might embrace that insight and offer an account of justice that
seeks to equalize citizens’ access to valuable challenges. In doing so,
they might resist equality of resources as the best interpretation of that
ideal, for, as we have established, the resourcist conception seeks to
accommodate individuals’ misconceptions about what constitute valu-
able challenges as well as their rightly judged conceptions. In resisting
liberal equality, such perfectionists might develop some of Dworkin’s
own remarks about worthwhile challenges. For example, he claims that,
other things equal, a challenge is more valuable if it offers individuals
the opportunity for “a more exciting, diverse, complex, and creative
life.”35 Granting that justice is a parameter, a perfectionist might ad-
vocate an equalization of opportunities to pursue such valuable chal-
lenges, which may well support the subsidization of particular lifestyles
that our humanist proposes. Thus, Dworkin’s intriguing claim that jus-
and the case of a child who would have died but for her parents’ use of their unjustly
high income to purchase expensive life-saving medical care for her. So, Dworkin does not
believe that living under just social institutions is a necessary condition of living well, but
this does not, I believe, affect the force of his argument which appeals to justice as a
parameter of ethics in criticism of conceptions of justice that rest on some reasonably
detailed account of well-being.
35. Ibid., p. 265. Dworkin illustrates the point with the claim that chess offers a more
valuable challenge than tictactoe.
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tice is a parameter with respect to ethics turns out to be compatible
with a substantive conception of what a valuable challenge consists of,
which can be employed as an alternative to the resourcism of liberal
equality.
This does not, of course, end the debate. The argument I have
offered is that a concern to advance individuals’ well-being, as under-
stood by the challenge model, does not prevent us from employing
some reasonably concrete conception of what a successful life consists
of to ground claims of distributive justice. Nevertheless, even if he ac-
cepted the arguments offered above, Dworkin might reply that we ought
to resist such a move for some other reason. Perhaps employing such
concrete information about well-being cannot be squared with other
intuitions that we have about distributive justice. Or perhaps Rawls is
right in claiming that the requirement that standards of interpersonal
comparison be publicly justifiable implies that we have reason not to
appeal to comprehensive doctrines when fashioning a metric of justice.36
All I have taken issue with is one of Dworkin’s arguments, which claims
that the challenge model of ethics supports liberal equality. As I have
indicated, there are other ethical arguments for liberal equality—the
“justice for hedgehogs” argument, for example—as well as arguments
that defend it by appeal to goods other than that of living well.
36. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 178–87.
